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Abstract
This paper explores an old problem, Byzantine fault-tolerant Broadcast (BB), under a
new model, selective broadcast model. The new model “interpolates” between the two
traditional models in the literature. In particular, it allows fault-free nodes to exploit
the benefits of a broadcast channel (a feature from reliable broadcast model) and allows
faulty nodes to send mismatching messages to different neighbors (a feature from
point-to-point model) simultaneously. The selective broadcastmodel is motivated by the
potential for directional transmissions on a wireless channel.
We provide a collection of results for a single-hop wireless network under the new
model. First, we present an algorithm for Multi-Valued BB that is order-optimal in bit
complexity. Then, we provide an algorithm that is designed to achieve BB efficiently
in terms of message complexity. Third, we determine some lower bounds on both bit
and message complexities of BB problems in the selective broadcast model. Finally, we
present a conjecture on an “exact” lower bound on the bit complexity of BB under the
selective broadcast model.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we address Byzantine fault-tolerant broadcast (or Byzantine Broadcast for short) under
a new model of a wireless broadcast channel. Byzantine Broadcast (BB) is a fundamental problem
in distributed computing [9]. Consider a system of n nodes, namely p1, ..., pn, of which at most t
nodes may be faulty. We assume that node p1 is the source for the Byzantine Broadcast (BB); the
remaining n − 1 nodes will be referred as peers. Byzantine Broadcast must satisfy the following
three properties, assuming that source p1’s input is x:
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• Termination: every fault-free peer pi eventually decides on an output value yi.
• Consistency: the output values of all the fault-free peers are equal, i.e., there exists y such
that, for every fault-free peer pi, yi = y.
• Validity: if the source node p1 is fault-free, then the agreed value must be identical to p1’s
input value, i.e., y = x.
We assume that the input x at source p1 is L bits long. The case when L = 1 will be referred to
as Binary BB, with the case when L > 1 being referred to asMulti-Valued BB.
We are interested in two measures of complexity of BB algorithms.
• Message complexity: Message complexity of an algorithm is defined as the maximum (i.e.,
worst-case) number of messages transmitted by all the nodes following the specification of
the algorithm over all permissible executions.
• Bit complexity: Bit complexity of an algorithm is defined as the maximum number of bits
transmitted by all the nodes following the specification of the algorithm over all permissible
executions.
The Byzantine Broadcast problem has been considered under different models of the commu-
nication network:
• Point-to-point model (e.g., [9, 3, 1, 10]): Nodes are connected via pairwise private channels,
with the network being modeled as a directed graph. Thus, if a channel (pi, p j) exists then
node pi can transmit information to p j – the channel is private in the sense that no other node
can overhear this transmission.
• Reliable Broadcast model (e.g., [8, 2, 4]): There are two models assuming the existence of
reliable broadcast channels. In both models, each node has a certain set of neighbors such
that a message sent by the node on the broadcast channel is received (reliably) by all its
neighbors. The first model corresponds to a radio network wherein nodes within a certain
distance of each node are considered its neighbors (e.g., [8, 2]). [4, 7] considers a model
wherein every subset of three nodes shares a reliable broadcast channel. Importantly, in both
models, the broadcast property holds for transmissions from faulty nodes as well. Thus,
each transmission of a (faulty or fault-free) node is received by all its neighbors.
In this paper, we consider a new model which “interpolates” between the above two models.
The motivation behind the new model is to understand the impact of the network assumption on
performance metrics of interest. Observe that:
• In the reliable broadcast model, performance can be improved by exploiting the broadcast
channel, since a single transmission can be received bymultiple nodes. However, this model
is somewhat optimistic in the sense that it does not allow for the possibility that a faulty
node may send different messages to different nodes. For instance, in a wireless setting, it
is conceivable that a faulty node may use beam-forming (or directional) antennas to send
different messages to its neighbors.
• While the point-to-point network model allows the faulty nodes to send different messages
to different neighbors, it does not provide the benefits of broadcast to the fault-free nodes.
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We now introduce our selective broadcast model. To simplify the discussion and analysis, we
assume a “single-hop” broadcast channel, as elaborated in the model below. However, the model
can be extended to “multi-hop” networks as well.
Selective Broadcast Model: The system is assumed to be synchronous. We assume that all the n
nodes share a channel on which broadcasts and unicasts can both be performed. A fault-free node
can broadcast its messages to all the nodes. However, a faulty node can simultaneously (in time)
send different messages to different nodes to maximize the impact of its misbehavior.
Faulty nodes cannot cause collisions on the channel. All transmissions are assumed to be
reliable. While multiple nodes may transmit messages on the shared channel within the same
“round”, for the purpose of the analysis of bit and message complexity, it is adequate to assume
that these transmissions are performed in parallel. (In real networks, the transmissions will be
serialized by a medium access mechanism – this detail is ignored in our work, since we focus on
bit and message complexity, not time complexity).
It is assumed that each node can correctly identify the transmitter of each message on the
selective broadcast channel.
Failure Model: The Byzantine adversary has complete knowledge of the algorithm, and the
source’s input value. The adversary can compromise up to t < n/3 nodes over the entire execution
of the algorithm. These compromised nodes are said to be faulty. The faulty node can arbitrarily
deviate from the algorithm specification, including sendingmismatching messages to other nodes.
2 Upper Bound on Bit Complexity - Multi-Valued BB
In this section, we present a Byzantine Broadcast algorithm for an L-bit input. The algorithm is
motivated by past algorithms that utilize “dispute control” or similar structures [6, 10]. For a
suitably chosen integer D, the algorithm consists of L/D “generations”, with Byzantine Broadcast
ofD bits of the input being achieved in each generation g (1 ≤ g ≤ L/D). For simplicity, we assume
that L/D is an integer. Input x at source node p1 is viewed as the tuple
x(1), x(2), · · · , x(L/D),
where each x(g) consists of D bits. In each generation g, each fault-free node pi obtains output
yi(g), and its L-bit output for all the generation together is obtained as the tuple
yi(1), yi(2), · · · , yi(L/D)
Our Byzantine Broadcast algorithmhas three phases: Detectable Broadcast,Detection Dissemination
and Dispute Control.
Byzantine Broadcast using Dispute Control
Perform the following steps in the g-th generation, g = 1, · · · , L/D.
• Detectable Broadcast of x(g): By the end of the Detectable Broadcast phase each fault-free
node pi receives a value, denoted as zi, such that one of the following two conditions is true:
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(i) at least one fault-free node detects misbehavior by some faulty node(s) in the network,
without necessarily identifying the faulty node(s), or
(ii) no fault-free node detects anymisbehavior, and for all fault-free peers pi and p j, we have
zi = z j, and additionally, if p1 is fault-free then zi = z j = x(g).
• Detection Dissemination: Each node performs a Byzantine broadcast (BB) of a single bit,
indicating whether it detected any misbehavior during Detectable Broadcast phase or not.
The 1-bit BB is performed using any previously proposed BB algorithm (e.g., [9, 3, 1]) for
the point-to-point model (note that algorithms designed for the point-to-point model can be
used under our selective broadcast model as well).
If no node announces that it detected misbehavior, then each fault-free node pi sets output
yi(g) equal to zi received in the Detectable Broadcast phase, and the Dispute Control phase is
not performed in the g-th generation.
• Dispute Control: If any node indicates, in theDetectionDisseminationphase, thatmisbehavior
has been detected, then additional steps are taken to learn new information regarding the
potential identity of the faulty nodes. In particular, a new pair of nodes is found “in dispute”
such that at least one node in this pair is guaranteed to be faulty. Two fault-free nodes
are never found in dispute with each other. The Dispute Control phase is performed using
a BB algorithm previously proposed for the point-to-point model (similar to the Detection
Dissemination phase), and as a by-product of Dispute Control, Byzantine Broadcast of x(g) is
also achieved. For brevity, we omit the details of the Dispute Control phase; similar dispute
control mechanisms have been included in prior work as well [6, 10].
For future reference, note that, any node that is found in dispute with more than t other
nodes must necessarily be faulty itself. Such a node is then essentially excluded from the
future generations of the algorithm. If the source node p1 is thus identified as faulty, then the
algorithm terminates with the nodes agreeing on a default value for all future generations.
As shown in prior work using Dispute Control, the bit complexity of such algorithms is dom-
inated by the first phase – Detectable Broadcast in our case – when the input size L is sufficiently
large. For brevity, we will omit the proof of this claim; the reader is referred to prior work (e.g.,
[10]) for examples of similar algorithms. There are two key reasons for this outcome:
• Although the 1-bit BB in the Detection Dissemination phase is performed using an expensive
(existing) algorithm, the cost of these disseminations is amortized over a large number of
bits, specifically D, in the input for each generation.
• Similarly, the Dispute Control phase is also expensive. However, it turns out that this phase
is performed only a finite number of times (specifically, at most t(t + 1) times). Thus, its
amortized cost over a large number of generations (i.e., large L/D) is small.
In the rest of this section, we present and analyze a Detectable Broadcast algorithm for D bits.
2.1 D-Bit Detectable Broadcast
The Detectable Broadcast phase makes use of an error detection code. Therefore, we first describe
the code and its parameters.
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Error Detection Code: With a suitable choice of parameter c, we will use a (n, n − 2t) Reed-
Solomon code over Galois Field GF(2c). In particular, c is chosen large enough such that n ≤ 2c − 1.
The D-bit value to be agreed on in each generation is viewed as consisting of n − 2t data symbols
fromGF(2c). Thus, each of these symbols can be representedwith c bits, and therefore,D = c(n−2t).
Given the (n − 2t) data symbols corresponding to a certain D-bit value, n “coded” symbols in the
corresponding codeword are obtained as linear independent combinations of the (n − 2t) data
symbols over GF(2c). The code specification is part of the specification of the Detectable Broadcast
algorithm. The (n, n − 2t) Reed-Solomon code has the following useful property: Any n − 2t
(coded) symbols in a codeword can be used to compute the corresponding n − 2t data symbols,
and therefore, the corresponding D-bit value. We summarize the relationships between the code
parameters:
• n coded symbols in each codeword, corresponding to (n − 2t) data symbols,
• n ≤ 2c − 1, and D = c(n − 2t)
This implies that n ≤ 2D/(n−2t) − 1, and D ≥ (n − 2t) log2(n + 1). Thus, we need D = Ω(n log n).
Detectable Broadcast: Algorithm 1 below specifies execution of Detectable Broadcast in the g-th
generation of the Byzantine Broadcast algorithm described above. Recall that x(g) is the input for
source p1 in the g-th generation.
Algorithm 1: Detectable Broadcast for the g-th Generation
1. Source p1 transmits x(g) on the selective broadcast channel. x(g) is viewed as a vector of n − 2t
data symbols, each consisting of c = D/(n − 2t) bits each.
2. Peer pi (2 ≤ i ≤ n) performs the following steps:
(a) If pi is in dispute with the source, stay silent.
Else, encode the n − 2t data symbols received in step 1 into a codeword consisting
of n coded symbols using the aforementioned coding scheme. Denote the resulting
codeword obtained at peer i as si = si[1], si[2], · · · , si[n]. Transmit si[i] on the selective
broadcast channel.
(b) Node pi ignores symbols received from peers that it has been previously in disputewith.
For each peer p j that node pi is not in dispute with: let the symbol received from peer
p j be denoted as ri[ j]. Also, if pi is not in dispute with p1, then let ri[1] = si[1]. For all
nodes pk such that pi is in dispute with pk (1 ≤ k ≤ n), define ri[k] =⊥ (⊥ denotes a
distinguished null symbol).
At the end of step 2b, every peer pi has one non-null symbol ri[ j] corresponding to each node
p j (1 ≤ j ≤ n) that has not yet been dispute with either pi or p1. Since p1 and pi can each be in
dispute with at most t nodes (otherwise they would have already been identified as faulty),
node pi has at least n − 2t non-null symbols in the ri vector.
3. Peer pi (2 ≤ i ≤ n) performs the following steps:
(a) Find the solution for each subset of n − 2t non-null coded symbols in the ri vector
received above in step 2b – the solution consists of n − 2t data symbols that correspond
to the n − 2t coded symbols.
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(b) If the solutions to all these subsets of size n−2t is not unique, then pi has detected faulty
behavior by some peer. In this case, zi is set equal to some default value.
Else, zi is set equal to the unique solution corresponding to any of the n − 2t non-null
symbols received in step 2b. The solution consists of n − 2t symbols, which correspond
to c(n − 2t) = D bits.
The bit complexity of Detectable Broadcast algorithm can be further reduced by using a more
efficient coding scheme. For lack of space, we omit the discussion here.
Correctness of Detectable Broadcast Algorithm
Lemma 1 By the end of Detectable Broadcast in g-th generation, the following conditions hold:
• either at least one fault-free node detects misbehavior by some faulty nodes,
• or for all fault-free peers pi and p j, zi = z j, and additionally, if p1 is fault-free then zi = z j = x(g).
Proof: In the Detectable Broadcast algorithm, the following misbehaviors are possible: Source p1
may misbehave in step 1 by transmitting different D-bit values (represented as n − 2t symbols) to
at least two different fault-free peers that are both not in dispute with the source. A peer nodemay
misbehave by transmitting incorrect symbols to some fault-free peer(s) in step 2b.
Consider two cases in the g-th generation:
• Source does not misbehave: : Since there are at least n − t fault-free nodes, and fault-free nodes
are never in dispute with each other, it is easy to see that, for each pair of fault-free peers pi
and p j, the vectors ri and r j will include at least n − t identical and correct coded symbols
corresponding to the data symbols sent by p1 in step 1. Then it should be easy to see that for
each pair of fault-free peers pi and p j, either (i) at least one of them will detect misbehavior
by some node, or (ii) zi = z j = x(g).
• Source node misbehaves: In this case, the source node is in dispute with at most t nodes
(otherwise, it would have been identified as faulty already). Thus, the source node is not in
disputewith at least (n−1)− t peers. Of these, n−1− t peers, at least (n−1− t)− (t−1) = n−2t
peers are fault-free. Since these fault-free peers cannot in dispute with each other, they will
collectively transmit at least identical n − 2t symbols to all the nodes. Therefore, all the
fault-free peers will share at least n−2t symbols in common in their r vectors. Then it should
be easy to see that for each pair of fault-free peers pi and p j, either (i) at least one of themwill
detect misbehavior by some node, or (ii) zi = z j.

Lemma 1 together with the correctness of Detection Dissemination and Dispute Control (similar
to the proofs in [10]) proves the correctness of the algorithm presented in this section.
2.2 Bit Complexity
Source node p1 transmits D bits in step 1. In step 2a, at most n − 1 peers each transmit a coded
symbol consisting of D/(n − 2t) bits, for a total cost of (n − 1)D/(n − 2t) bits in step 2a. Thus, the
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worst-case cost of a single instance of Detectable Broadcast (in bits) is
D +
(n − 1)D
n − 2t
Thus, the total cost ofDetectable Broadcast over all the L/D generations required to perform Byzan-
tine Broadcast of the L-bit input at node p1 is given by
L +
(n − 1)L
n − 2t
= L
2n − 2t − 1
n − 2t
As noted previously, with the dispute control framework, when L is large, the bit complexity
of Byzantine Broadcast of L-bits is dominated by the bit complexity of Detectable Broadcast. In
particular, it can be shown that if we use the Modular Algorithm [3] to perform 1-bit BB in
Detection Dissemination and Dispute Control phase, then the communication cost (in bits) of the
proposed Byzantine Broadcast algorithm is
L
2n − 2t − 1
n − 2t
+ O(n4)L0.5
When L is large, the first term dominates the above cost, and the bit complexity becomes O(L).
By assumption, n ≥ 3t + 1, and therefore,
2 <
2n − 2t − 1
n − 2t
< 4
3 Upper Bound on Message Complexity
In this section, we briefly describe a Byzantine Broadcast algorithm, named Algorithm 2, with
message complexityO(t log t) under the selective broadcastmodel. This algorithm isderived fromthe
Modular Algorithm proposed by Coan and Welch [3], which achieves optimal message complexity
of O(n2) in the point-to-point model. Algorithm 2 has the same structure as theModular Algorithm
except for the following modifications:
• In theModular Algorithm, a nodemay often send identical messages tomultiple neighbors. In
our algorithm, such transmissions are replaced by one broadcast message over the selective
broadcast channel.
• TheModular Algorithm is performedby all the n nodes. In our case, we use amodified version
of that algorithm to achieve Byzantine Broadcast among 3t+1 nodes. After that, any 2t+1 of
these 3t + 1 nodes transmit the agreed value on the selective broadcast channel; the remaining
n − 3t − 1 nodes agree on a majority vote of these transmissions.
• The number of levels of recursion in our algorithm is log n, different from that in the original
Modular Algorithm [3].
Now, we briefly present the framework from [3] and its variation for the selective broadcast
model.
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3.1 Modular Framework [3]
The framework proposed by Coan and Welch [3] consists of recursive applications of two trans-
formations, BC2BCB and BCB2BC: the first transformation, namely BC2BCB, uses a Byzantine
Consensus (BC) algorithm to solve a Byzantine Committee Broadcast (BCB) problem, and the
latter transformation, namely BCB2BC, uses a BCB algorithm to solve the BC problem.
The base case of theModular Framework is a previously proposedBCalgorithm (e.g., [9, 1]), say
A0. Then, the recursive definition of the Modular Framework is as follows: Given algorithm Ai−1
(i ≥ 1), Ai is defined as BCB2BC(BC2BCB(Ai−1)). For brevity, we omit the details of the framework;
the reader is referred to the prior work [3]. Themain reason that theModular Framework achieves
lowmessage complexity is as that the number of message transmissions induced by the expensive
base algorithm is small. This is achieved by recursively dividing the nodes intomany “committees”
of small size such that the base algorithm is only executed within each of these small committees.
Algorithm 2: Modular Algorithm [3] is designed for the Byzantine Consensus (BC) problems,
wherein each node has an input. To perform Byzantine Broadcast (BB) using a modified Modular
algorithm, the source node first broadcasts its input value on the selective broadcast channel, and
then a modified Modular algorithm is used to reach consensus on the value received by all the
peers from the source . Now, we describe two modifications of Modular Algorithm to achieve BC
efficiently in the selective broadcast model.
In the Modular Algorithm, when fault-free nodes transmit, they always transmit the same
message to all the intended receivers. Thus, replacing these transmissions by a single transmission
in selective broadcast channel reduces the message complexity.
The second modification further exploits the reliable broadcast channel. Unlike Modular
Algorithm, Algorithm 2 only requires n′ = 3t + 1 active nodes participating in the algorithm, i.e.,
executing Algorithm 2, due to the existence of selective broadcast channel. The remaining n − 3t − 1
nodes (which we call passive nodes) do not transmit messages at all, but listen to the messages
announcing the agreed value, transmitted by any 2t + 1 active nodes. The passive nodes then use
majority voting on these 2t + 1 values to decide on their output.
3.2 Message Complexity
Suppose that M∗(n
′) is the message complexity of the base algorithm executed by n′ nodes. For
any fixed integer B such that t + 1 ≥ B ≥ 2, by using analysis similar to that in [3], we can show
the upper bound below on message complexity of Ai, denoted as Mi, for all logB t ≥ i ≥ 0. In the
inequality below, α is a certain constant that depends on the transformation used in the Modular
Algorithm.
Mi(3t + 1) ≤ B
iM∗(3t/B
i
+ 1) + αBti , (1)
Replacing i = logB t andM∗(n
′) = O((n′)3) in equation 1 yieldsMlogB t(3t + 1) ≤ O(t log t).
1
The message complexity of Algorithm 2 is MlogB t(3t + 1) + 2t + 1, and is thus bounded by
O(t log t).
1Here, we use the Gradecast-based algorithm [1] as the base algorithm.
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4 Lower Bounds
In this section, we state some simple lower bounds on bit and message complexity. In deriving
these bounds, we assume that the nodes only communicate explicitly through messages. That is,
no implicit communication mechanism is used to convey information, such as the time between
two message transmissions.
Lower Bound on Message Complexity:
Theorem 1 The lower bound onmessage complexity of Byzantine Broadcast under the selective broadcast
model is Ω(t).
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Assume that there exists a correct algorithm A under the
selective broadcast model that has message complexity of o(t). The transmission of a message by a
certain node on the selective broadcast channel can be simulated by sending a copy of the message
to each of the remaining n − 1 nodes in a fully connected point-to-point network. Thus, algorithm
A can solve the Byzantine Broadcast problem using o(nt) messages in a point-to-point model. This
contradicts the lower bound in [5].
Alternatively, the theorem can be proved by arguing that more than t messages must be sent
in the worst-case: if only t (or fewer) messages are sent, it is possible that the transmitters (at most
t) of all these messages are faulty nodes, making it impossible to guarantee agreement among the
fault-free nodes. 
The gap between the above lower bound of Ω(t) and the upper bound of O(t log t) in Section 3
is small, but the problem of closing this gap remains open.
Lower Bound on Bit Complexity: It should be obvious that the total number of bits transmitted
in any BB algorithm is at least L (in the worst case), since there are 2L possible input values. Thus,
Ω(L) is a trivial lower bound on bit complexity, and our algorithm presented in Section 2 matches
this bound when L is large enough.
Lower Bound on Bit Complexity of “Static” Algorithms for Detectable Broadcast: Analgorithm
A is characterized by a set of schedules where each schedule consists of a sequence of transmission
slots. In each slot i, a single node is selected as the transmitter, denoted as Ti. The transmitter Ti
transmits a message via the selective broadcast channel to all the other nodes. An algorithm is said
to be static if it has a fixed schedule, such that the transmitters in all the slots are pre-determined
and are independent of the source’s input and the behavior of the faulty nodes.
We state the following lower boundonbit complexity of static algorithms forDetectable Broadcast
(DB). For lack of space, we only present the case when no two nodes are in dispute, and the proof is
omitted. The proof argues that in a static schedule, the source p1 must transmit at least L bits, and
then argue that the remaining nodes must transmit at least (n − 1) Ln− f bits to satisfy the conditions
of Detectable Broadcast.
Claim 1 The lower bound on bit complexity of static DB algorithm is 2
2Note that this lower bound is also a lower bound of static BB algorithms, since any BB algorithm also solves DB
problems. Note that algorithms in [9, 3, 1] are static BB algorithms, but the algorithm presented in Section 2 is not static.
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L + (n − 1)
L
n − f
5 Summary
This paper introduces a new communication model that “interpolates” between two old models
in the literature. In particular, we explore the impact of allowing nodes to select between broadcast
and unicast on bit and message complexity. In the new model, we present a Multi-Valued BB
algorithm that is order-optimal in bit complexity, and another BB algorithm that is efficient in
message complexity. At last, we briefly discuss about lower bounds on bit andmessage complexity
in the new model.
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